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Boyle, Robert M and Wannop, Urlan (1982) Area initiatives and the SDA : the rise of the urban project. Quarterly Economic Commentary, 8 (1). pp. 45-57. ISSN 0306-7866 ,

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Special Article

AREA INITIATIVES AND THE SDA: THE RISE OF THE URBAN PROJECT

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THE SDA AND THE EMERGING AREA INITIATIVES

The allocation of central government resources on a geographical basis through special agencies has a well-established history in Scotland. The Scottish Special Housing Association was supplementing the capacities of small authorities unable to mount local housebuilding programmes to support economic development prior to 1939, when the Scottish Industrial Estates Corporation was also at work. Government intervention in the post-war period continued this spatial - as distinct from sectoral - focus, with policies and programmes developing the physical and social infrastructure thought necessary for the attraction or expansion of manufacturing industry. In the 1940's and 1950's, new towns at East Kilbride, Glenrothes and Cumbernauld, the rapid construction of public sector housing by the SSHA - particularly in response to the overspill policy of the City of Glasgow - and the continued development of modern, serviced factories by the SIEC in areas such as Clydebank and Newhouse, all provided central government with a major opportunity to shape the strategic location and scale of new urban development in Scotland.

This spatial discrimination became a more explicit feature of government policy with the identification in the 1963 White Paper (Cmd. 2188) of selected 'growth areas' in Central Scotland. The areas varied in size and real potential, but it was significant that both East Kilbride and Cumbernauld were identified as locations having potential for economic development in addition to their original urgent purpose of relieving bad housing conditions in Glasgow and North Lanarkshire. Government policy delivered on the basis of spatial priorities was further developed via regional policy. The designation of Development Areas and Special Development Areas in many parts of Scotland, particularly on Clydeside, allowed government to complement their investment in Social Overhead Capital with indirect assistance to manufacturing industries. The 'growth area' strategy was effectively narrowed when government designated further new towns at Irvine and Livingstone. A series of socio-economic/physical sub-regional plans in areas such as Grangemouth-Falkirk and Central Borders directed government expenditure to locations where the Scottish Office saw the possibility of sustained economic growth allied to new residential development. The Vale of Leven and North Lanarkshire received no favours to reflect their earlier equal designation as 'growth areas'.

*The views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Fraser of Allander Institute.

The West Central Scotland Plan (1974) was the last of the plans initiated by the Scottish Office before the institution of the new Regional Councils in 1975. It anticipated the shift away from regional policy towards local economic initiatives and in the significant elements of its physical and economic strategies was adopted by the new Strathclyde Regional Council and by central government (Randall, 1980). The new Labour Government was especially sympathetic to the proposed 'SEDCOR' (Scottish Economic Development Corporation), as an agent of government with powers for direct involvement with Scottish industry and commerce. This recommendation coincided with a Labour Party commitment to the establishment of a development agency for Scotland and very quickly was enacted in the Scottish Development Act of 1975.

The enacted scope of the Agency ran beyond the unequivocally economic field with additional potential which few observers at the time may have expected to become so significant:

- (1) the furthering of economic development;
- (2) the maintenance, provision and safeguarding of employment;
- (3) the promotion of industrial efficiency and international competitiveness; and
- (4) the improvement of the environment

In absorbing the Small Industries Council for Rural Areas, the Scottish Industrial Estates Corporation (SIEC) and the Derelict Land Unit of the SDD, the SDA quickly became an important part of the industrial policy community in Scotland (Hogwood, 1979). Using this broad remit and working within very general guidelines, the Agency adopted the perhaps impossible target "to foster the regeneration of the Scottish economy and to work alongside others to that end", (SDA, 1978). Initially, however, the Agency's role was "reactive" (Kirwan, 1981) to initiatives from the private sector. There is no evidence that the SDA's investment decisions nor their programme of environmental improvement had in-built spatial priorities at this time, whatever the predominant concern for the West of Scotland amongst members of the Board.

Independent of industrial investment strategy, the SDA was nevertheless quickly involved in a major area initiative in the role of co-ordinator of the GEAR project in Glasgow. Apparently with some initial reluctance, the Agency accepted the role of co-ordinating the multi-agency urban renewal programme for the East End of the City as well as participating in its own right in terms of environmental improvement, some social initiatives and factory building (Table 1). The GEAR programme has been variously discussed especially in terms of accountability (Nelson, 1980) and 'value for money' (Orton, 1982) - yet it illustrates two central features of how the SDA operates. Firstly, the dilemma between the objectives of investing in sectors/areas which demonstrate potential as against supporting industries or communities suffering from the decline too easily found in the East End. Although a major review of the project is being made by SDA in 1982, there is little doubt that the latter objective was paramount, not only in GEAR but in many of the subsequent area initiatives. Secondly, GEAR laid the ground-rules for a new style of local planning and development in urban areas, whereby a government agency co-ordinated the capital programmes and some other initiatives of a diverse range of local and central governmental

TABLE 1:
AREA INITIATIVES : SUMMARY

NAME	DESIGNATION	STARTING DATA	TARGET DATA	OBJECTIVES	CAPITAL EXPENDITURE : TO '82	CAPITAL EXPENDITURE : TOTAL EXPECTED	TARGET : EMPLOYMENT	TARGET : FIRM
GEAR : Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal	Co-ordination of urban regeneration	May 1976	?	"physical, social and economic regeneration ... for the benefit of both residents and business community"	£34.2m	£47.0m ('83)		
GLENGARNOCK	Task Force	Jan.1979	?	regeneration of local economy; assistance to local industry; re-use of steelworks	£ 8.2m	£13.4m	c2000	80-100
CLYDEBANK	Task Force	Mar.1980	?	promotion of Enterprise Zone, development of 'Business Park' and extension of industrial estates to create new employment	£10.5m	£19.0m	5000	200+
DUNDEE (1) Blackness	Project Agreement	Oct.1981	1985 (86)	co-ordinated implementation of Business Development Area	£ 1.3m	£ 6.0m		
(2) City	To be determined	1982	1985	commercial development of Waterfront and wider industrial initiatives	Nil	£18m	1200	
LEITH	Project Agreement	May.1981	1984	stem decline in business activity; realise potential; assist residents in gaining access to jobs; improve environment	£ 2.8m	£ 7.0m	800	
MOTHERWELL	Project Agreement	Apr.1982	1987	removal of development constraints, develop 'unique advantages', increase job opportunities, diversify economic structure	£ 0.5m	£37.0m	3000 permanent 300-500 temporary	

Sources: Annual Reports, Project Agreements, Task Force Reports, GEAR Reports.

bodies. Indeed, within six months after GEAR began it was argued that the experience would "enable the Agency in the future to offer help... in other parts of Scotland", (SDA, 1978). Four years on, area projects were to figure prominently in the overall programme of the Agency.

The emerging area focus became sharper in the 1978/79 period when the Scottish Economic Planning Department introduced the Agency to assist with areas of 'special need' requiring an 'in depth' approach. The closure of the Glengarnock steelworks led to an SDA 'Taskforce' with the remit to "prevent the further decline of the Garnock Valley Community", (SDA, 1979). Working with BSC (Industry) Ltd and the local authorities, the Taskforce was given preferential support within the Agency to accelerate industrial, social and environmental investment in the area. An initial target of 800 jobs by 1982 was set but no termination date was or has subsequently been given for the withdrawal of the Taskforce. The Taskforce model for Agency intervention was repeated in Clydebank, where the closure of the Singer works compounded the collapse of the town's staple industries. The Clydebank Taskforce concentrated on the redevelopment of the Singer works as a Business Park on the promotion of the Enterprise Zone designated in 1981. Building on the continuing GEAR programme, "the Agency (was) exploring further urban renewal opportunities. Local authorities (were) being encouraged to establish co-ordinated projects for the alleviation of deep-seated problems to be found in other deprived areas throughout Scotland", (SDA, 1979).

The Agency's explorations found new territories the following year with the identification by the Planning and Projects Directorate of the need for a new approach to Agency intervention in local economies. "Comprehensive integrated projects" were conceived for Leith and Dundee (Blackness), with the Agency undertaking a managerial role in a variety of projects in support of an economic development programme. The understanding between the parties as to their respective contributions became "Project Agreements" (Table 1) between the SDA and local government, with pre-determined but legally unenforceable financial commitments by the different parties. These were seen as three to five year pump-priming exercises with in certain circumstances specific employment targets. Although the three Project Agreements signed to date cover areas experiencing decline in manufacturing employment, the Agency has argued that it will "adopt a planned and selective approach..... (and the) emphasis will be placed on economic and industrial regeneration and the crucial criterion in the selection of these areas will be their potential for improved performance" (SDA, 1981). Initially, the Project Teams were staffed by the Urban Renewal Directorate. Hence, by late 1981, three of the six directorates in the Agency were notably involved with area initiatives.

The importance of these different area approaches was reflected in the professional restructuring of the Agency in 1982 with the formation of an Area Development Directorate, a combination of Urban Renewal and part of Estates and Environment. This was seen to be the logical approach to implementing the different models of GEAR, the Taskforces and the Project Agreements, which were in total absorbing some 60% of the Agency's annual capital expenditure of other directorates (Table 2).

Table 2 Agency Capital Expenditure in Project Areas 1982-84

	Small Business Development	Encouragement of Investment	Support for Technology	Support Programmes	Total
%	32.0	37.0	3.0	28.0	100.0%
£m	20.5	24.0	2.0	18.0	£64.5m

Source: SDA (1981), 1980 Prices

With the signing of the Motherwell Project Agreement early in 1982, the exploration of new initiatives in areas including Dundee, Monklands, Renfrew and Port Dundas (Glasgow) and the encouragement of self-help schemes in North Ayrshire and Wigton, it was clear that spatial considerations were expected to continue to play an important role in resource allocation by the SDA.

ON WHAT SCALE IS THE AGENCY INTERVENING?

The Urban Renewal role of the Agency has been growing most rapidly of all its principal functions (see Table 3). Up to 1979/80, Urban Renewal expenditure included investment in GEAR but not under the Project Agreements subsequently signed for Leith, Blackness and Motherwell. Nor did expenditures falling under Urban Renewal include factory and environmental investment in GEAR drawn from Factories and Industrial Estates and Land Renewal funds. Additionally, co-ordination by the SDA in GEAR and in the subsequent Project Areas appears to have obtained a higher level of expenditure by local authorities and other public agencies than would have been without intervention by the SDA. The extent of additional investment is debatable. It would probably include only a small part of the £20m with which the District and Regional Councils will match the £37m which the SDA will make available to spend in Motherwell over the 5 years life of that Project. It may be that some of the additional investment in the Project Areas takes the form of protection of building programmes and services which budgetary cuts are delaying or reducing elsewhere. In the case of GEAR, the level of housing capital investment has been sustained since the project began in 1976 by means of the Scottish Special Housing Association displacing Glasgow District Council as the dominant investor in the area, during a period in which Scottish local authorities were reducing housing capital expenditure by almost half (Table 6).

Looking ahead, there is apparent potential to continue to sustain a faster rate of increase of expenditure on Area Projects than in other parts of the Agency's budget. The list of potential projects in Scotland reaches well beyond the twelve projects in Strathclyde for which the Regional Council has been pressing the Agency to progressively complete Project Agreements. The annual rate of expenditure of £12m (1982 prices) already committed to the Leith, Blackness and Motherwell Projects will certainly increase as other projects are added.

The Scottish dimension of the national rise of urban policy at the expense of regional policy has been commented on elsewhere (Ashcroft, 1982). The

rise of the Agency's initiatives in the project areas (Table 3) can be compared to the considerable real reduction in Scottish New Town investment (Table 4).

In relation to public expenditure in Scotland on Trade, Industry and Employment (Table 5), the scale of the overall decline has overwhelmed the scale of the Agency's activities. The more interesting of these comparisons in the matter of strategic urban development is the relationship to New Town investment, whatever the greater economic and social significance of the collapse of spending in industry and employment at large. When expenditure in the Project Areas by the Scottish Special Housing Association and the Housing Corporation is added into the count of Agency investment, the relative deflation of the New Towns in strategic development becomes more considerable.

Table 3 SDA Expenditure

Current Prices £'000 (%)

	1976/77	1977/78	1978/79	1979/80	1980/81
Industry, Investments & Small Businesses	3,502 (17.79)	9,745 (18.80)	6,650 (9.90)	9,750 (10.50)	6,272 (6.62)
Factories and Indus- trial Estates	14,565 (74.00)	25,819 (49.81)	36,231 (53.93)	48,427 (52.15)	47,099 (49.71)
Land Renewal	1,273 (6.47)	14,472 (27.92)	19,505 (29.03)	26,386 (28.41)	22,767 (24.03)
Urban Renewal	81 (0.41)	787 (1.52)	2,237 (3.33)	4,889 (5.26)	13,262 (14.00)
Research, Promotion, Infor- mation & Capital Equipment	262 (1.33)	989 (1.91)	2,555 (3.80)	3,416 (3.68)	5,353 (5.65)
TOTAL	19,683 (100)	51,830 (100)	67,178 (100)	92,868 (100)	94,753 (100)

It is more difficult to compare the size of the Agency's role in urban development to that of local authorities than to other arms of policy of the Secretary of State, or of Government Departments. The degree to which Area Projects are demonstration projects or are a major encroachment by central government on the traditional responsibility of local government for urban renewal is unclear.

The figures suggest, however, that the substantial reductions in local authority capital expenditure (Table 6) are unlikely to be made good by Agency investment. Similarly, the real reduction in Rate Support Grant for the Districts within which the Projects have been launched has to be related to the new investment brought by the SDA, SSHA, Housing Corporation, Health Boards and Manpower Services Commission who are variously associated with the Project.

Table 4 New Town Capital Expenditure

Current Prices £'000

	1976/77	1977/78	1978/79	1979/80	1980/81
Cumbernauld, East Kilbride, Glenrothes, Irvine, Livingston	53,162	42,342	46,541	53,579	61,551

**Table 5 Public Expenditure in Scotland on Trade,
Industry and Employment**

Current Prices £'000

	1976/77	1977/78	1978/79	1979/80	1980/81
Trade, Industry & Employment	411,800	300,400	317,400	318,100	N/A

Table 6 Local Authority Capital Expenditure in Scotland

1980 Survey Prices £'000

	1976/77	1977/78	1978/79	1979/80	1980/81
Housing	336,000	313,000	290,000	278,000	210,000
Other Environmental Services	188,000	148,000	161,000	163,000	132,000

WHY AN AREA AND NOT A SECTORAL APPROACH TO INVESTMENT?

In the absence of a comprehensive corporate policy statement from central government and the Agency, we can only speculate as to the reasons for the growth in importance of the Area approach to investment. The different initiatives embracing GEAR, the Taskforces and the Project Agreements may be interpreted in a multiplicity of ways, but three factors would appear to play a significant role.

Organisational Factors

Because of the close relationship between the Agency and the SEPD (Kirwan 1981), the Area Projects can certainly be interpreted as a reformation of, or substitute for, the declining influence of UK regional policy. The Leith Project, for example, can be construed as central government support in the absence of Development Area status. This connectivity to central government leads us to suggest that the Agency's Area Projects might also have been used as a vehicle for the relatively rapid implementation of central policies, by-passing, augmenting or at least enlivening the response of local government to the problems of declining industrial areas. There is little doubt that the Project Agreements are the Scottish equivalent of English Industrial Improvement Areas, which also may be designated and backed by central government finance in Scotland under the 1978 Inner Urban Areas Act but as yet not embarked upon except in the form of SDA initiatives.

Internally, the area focus of the Agency has plainly been assisted by the background and skills of staff employed in the Urban Renewal, Estates and Environment and to a lesser extent in the Planning and Projects Divisions who frequently came from organisations which had a specific spatial, often physical focus - New Town Development Corporations and estates or planning departments in local government. They also brought experience of initiating high profile, location specific projects which attracted and held media and public interest. This organisational 'style' may have helped the SDA offset its inevitable difficulty in reporting more than preliminary steps towards its target of regenerating the Scottish economy.

Economic Factors

As has been suggested elsewhere (Davies, 1978), the conflict between sustaining employment and achieving profitability made the Agency's initial objectives unattainable except in small advances. The early difficulties of securing equity involvement with private companies, a new Government, the adverse publicity surrounding a minority of unsuccessful investments and deepening economic problems, particularly in the West of Scotland, all led to a re-assessment of how and of where the SDA could be influential. This led to a strengthening of the Small Business Division, the creation with the Scottish Office of the 'Locate in Scotland Bureau', and, probably, to the promotion of an explicit area focus. This shift can also be explained in terms of a move from a 'reactive' to an 'anticipatory' mode of operation for the Agency, being pursued by the Industry Directorate by a focus on selected industrial or business sectors including the health care industries. The area focus now preferred by the Area Development Directorate can be viewed in a similar strategic light.

Political Factors

The emerging area focus can certainly be explained in terms of the impact of the change of government in 1979. Revised guidelines issued by the SEPD led to changes in the remit of the Agency emphasising:

- (1) development of Scottish entrepreneurship;
- (2) support for growth sectors;
- (3) promotion of new technology;
- (4) improvement of industrial efficiency and competitiveness; and
- (5) regeneration of local economies.

This shift of emphasis away from the employment/environment objectives of 1975/76 highlighted a more general business orientated approach allied to specific locational programmes. Area Projects have allowed the SDA to continue to undertake investments which have avowed social in addition to commercial objectives.

More generally, the variety of area initiatives can be seen in a wider political context. They allow government to respond to local political pressure through the Agency; they channel and control local public expenditure outside the local authority system; they provide government with a convenient means of sustaining other parts of government policy and expenditure; they enable the present Government to directly intervene in industry and commerce (particularly small business) without attracting adverse criticism for their intervention in free enterprise; they allow the Agency to maintain a high level of spending in a period when industrial investment is at a low and slack level.

In conclusion, then, some of the most significant characteristics of area initiatives may be seen as:

- (1) a return to the strategy of infrastructural investment of the 1960's following the failure of regional policy;
- (2) one example of extending central control over local public expenditure and further weakening the role of local government in assisting economic development (see Grant, 1982 for comment on this issue); and
- (3) the consolidation of the SDA's position through an urban development rather than an industrial role.

HOW SHOULD THE AGENCY'S ROLE BE EVALUATED?

The issue of how to evaluate its variety of economic and quasi-economic investments may have been debated even more considerably within the SDA than by outside commentators (eg Davies, 1978). The origination within the Agency of industrial and environmental initiatives with differing degrees of economic, social, physical and political justification would inevitably raise internal questions about priorities and evaluation, particularly from those in the Agency with a background in investment and project appraisal. Within the industrial investment field, it can be argued (McNicol and Swales, 1982) that ambiguity in the Agency's objectives demands greater flexibility in evaluating investments than could be reflected in measured rates of financial return based on 'commercial principles'. The ambiguity in the Agency's objectives lies not merely in the political undertones to the phraseology of the Scottish Development Agency Act, but has been sustained by the occasional statements of ministers or by their encouragement of the Agency to new initiatives containing dimensions outside the more obvious intentions of the Act. The social and community purposes of the GEAR Project - co-ordinated by the Agency from 1976 - raised tensions in relation to the twin objectives of economic and environmental development incorporated in the Agency Act, whatever the problems already inherent in defining and evaluating these statutory objectives.

Evaluating the impact of urban policy has only been lightly explored in the United States and barely attempted in the United Kingdom. There is little precedent by which the SDA could have established any unified or comprehensive framework within which to appraise its Area Projects in relation to their potential longer term impact on the Scottish economy, the Scottish environment or other of the concerns overtly or covertly attached to the Agency. Clearly, the political origins of the SDA complicate evaluation, as does the inevitability that some Area Projects may be stimulated as much by the Agency's need to keep its balance in the geographical politics of Scotland as by strict comparisons of geographical needs and opportunities.

The Agency's approach to evaluation in its environmental role has included cost-benefit appraisal, when considering the general order of priorities as between the reclamation of pit bings and other semi-rural projects. It has also been applied to the recovery of vacant land and degraded parts of urban Scotland, to which the Agency has subsequently switched the emphasis of expenditure. It appears that the Area Projects are not yet appraised in advance in a comparable fashion, nor has a basis for longer term evaluation been established either in economic terms or in relation to the impact of projects on strategic urban development. The Project Agreements for Leith and Motherwell contain selected targets for provision of factory floor space, roadworks and other investment by which progress can be measured, but these are primarily indicators of speed of management and not clearly so of the objective success of the Project. The most significant intention in an objective sense might be thought to be the job targets - to create 3,000 permanent jobs over 5 years in Motherwell and to create and safeguard 800 jobs over 3 years in Leith; no job target has been officially announced for the Blackness Project in Dundee, but a target is being pressed by the Agency for the Dundee City Project announced in July 1982.

By this point, a very wide range of questions can be raised around the issues of project appraisal, evaluation, objectives, targets and Projects Agreements relating to the urban initiatives of the SDA. If this role of

the Agency is to be sustained it does, of course, also raise important questions over Central-Local Government relations, including the possible misfit in the current disposition of planning functions within the administrative system and the now diminished relevance of the 1960's analysis of strategic planning problems in Scotland, which dominated in shaping the present system of Scottish local government. However, we will arbitrarily narrow our range of comment by leaving political and administrative issues for discussion elsewhere. Commentary on some of the economic and strategic implications of Area Projects has already surrounded GEAR (Orton, 1982; Booth et al, 1982). While some of this discussion appears unaware rather than neglectful of the political origins of GEAR, which lay in the Scottish Office's dissatisfaction with the speed and quality of urban renewal achieved by the former Glasgow Corporation by comparison with the perceived successes in development of the New Towns, it has touched on economic and strategic questions which become even more significant as a single demonstration project (GEAR) is extended into a programme of urban investment spreading across Scotland. Booth, Money and Pitt underestimate the innovative significance of GEAR and its catalytic influence in aspects of Glasgow's administration, including the acceleration of new housing policies, as well as hinting at an unfavourable judgement on the performance of GEAR for which existing evidence is slight and against which contrary evidence may be becoming available. Orton may underestimate the substantial level of economic activity remaining in the East End of Glasgow as he does the growing probability that since 1977, investment has run at a higher level than would have occurred in the absence of GEAR, yet these are merely inputs to be more exactly measured in the strategic evaluation for which he makes a proper case.

If the Agency's principal objectives are enacted as the twin pursuits of economic and environmental improvement in Scotland, we are immediately faced with the overriding problem in evaluating the Project Area programme. Neither objective is given primacy in the SDA Act and each, to some degree, contributes something to the other. The measurement of environmental benefits and costs is an established field of investigation, but yet very small by comparison with that of economic appraisal. It might be unwise to suggest that environmental returns are less readily measured than economic returns, but there are familiar difficulties in comparing the two and in considering them within the same framework. Yet, the attempt has to be made if the Agency's objectives are to remain inter-linked and if their Project Area programme is to be evaluated against these principal objectives rather than the primarily managerial yardsticks contained within the Project Agreements. Of course, if as some would have it an unstated role of the Agency is the withholding of certain public expenditures from the hands of local authorities, then managerial yardsticks would have some importance, helping to measure the rate and quality of urban re-investment achieved by SDA intervention by comparison with that commonly possible by local authority management alone.

The Agency's dilemma is wider than the uncertainty over whether the degree to which Area Projects are to be regarded as initiatives for economic recovery, or as programmes to more rapidly re-occupy vacant land and eliminate environmental squalor in Scottish towns and cities. By choosing an area focus and defining a boundary and programme of action for the projects, the Project Agreements tend to imply that evaluation should be similarly confined. The perils associated with too narrow an application of the area approach are the greater when the commitment of a project team to its area risks institutional partisanship of the kind most dangerously exemplified in the recent history of the Scottish New Town Development Corporations. Within an economic evaluation, a multiplicity of issues arise over the measures by which, firstly, the initial decision to embark on the Project should be reached and, secondly, by which its long-term

performance can be gauged. The problems are exemplified by the different approaches of the successive Project Agreements so far concluded.

First, the target set for Leith is to create and safeguard 800 jobs over three years, primarily in manufacturing. But how would the safeguarded jobs be identified? If only jobs in established firms given direct Agency support through financing of premises were to be considered to be safeguarded, it would deny the economic significance of stoneclearing, tree-planting and rehabilitation of derelict sites, which are principal elements in the environmental programme seen by the Agency as a support to the economic thrust of the project. Because these environmental benefits will not be very localised, it might be argued that most jobs in Leith would receive some support and that the project target would be met provided that at least 800 of the 11,500 manufacturing jobs recently in Leith remained after the three years of the project. While this latter outcome would presumably leave all participants in the project gravely unhappy, it characterises the difficulty of measuring the impact of policy where environmental action is regarded as having an economic or environmental benefit exceeding that of many manufacturing jobs.

Secondly, the Blackness Project has no job target attached to the Agreement. Blackness is a small part of inner Dundee and the Project's lack of a job target can be argued as wholly appropriate, because it would be difficult to show that jobs created in the area would have been additional to those which would have been created elsewhere in Dundee in the absence of the Project. Similarly, any jobs 'safeguarded' for Blackness by the Project might in its absence have moved to another part of Dundee, so causing little or no loss to employment in the City nor perhaps to the Dundee economy. Questions on what firms have done because of the Project or would not have done in its absence could, of course, be put through a direct survey. The answers would not immediately justify or deny the economic virtues of a Project, of course, for which a much wider evaluation would be required placing the Project Area in the context of its city or urban region, if not also in a national context. The problem is well covered by Ashcroft (1982).

Thirdly, the Motherwell Project Agreement has returned to the setting of a job target, not necessarily to be primarily in manufacturing as in Leith but specified as being 'permanent'. While the very large extent of the Motherwell Project Area which includes most of the District may present a sounder basis for measuring the project's economic impact, the definition of a 'permanent' job presumably could include the stabilisation of a temporary or vulnerable one and might therefore include job safeguarding as well as job creation. The Project Agreement is unclear on this point, as it is on whether the target encompasses only net additions to the existing stock in any SIC group, or may also include jobs in a new supermarket which will cause a net loss of employment in retailing in the District.

In July 1982, the Agency announced their intention to invest £28m in Dundee jointly with the local authorities over a period of three years. This was a significant development, because the original expectation was that the project would be confined to the Waterfront and the Project had now been extended to the City as a whole. However, the target had now been set as the creation of 1,200 'new' jobs, involving new problems of definition and of evaluation in relation to possible net loss of jobs consequential upon the creation of 'new' opportunities.

As a small step towards a more comprehensive evaluation, job targets contain large difficulties in their own terms, let alone those of a fuller economic and strategic evaluation. There is the same unresolved tension between employment and other economic indicators as measures of economic performance as has underlain regional economic policy in the United Kingdom throughout its history. There is tension too between performance measures for the particular area of a project and those for its parent economic regions, from the scale of its urban and city region up to and beyond the Scottish level. But this is an old problem revisited.

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